EXHIBIT F

PART 5

perhaps field inspection reports and the case captions and the artifact would have been searchable.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Do you know if that exists today?

A. I don't know.

Q. I am going to take you down to the paragraph on page 13 that begins with another safety philosophy.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. It says another safety philosophy developed over the years by safety professionals in using evaluation of equipment, risk minimization is a safety priority approach or hierarchy.

Are you familiar with that safety hierarchy?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain for us what that hierarchy is?

A. Hierarchy goes something like this, in a vacuum, in a void, if you knew nothing else, this is the way you might approach a hazard. The best thing you can do is eliminate the hazard.

So if the hazard is exposure to a

chemical, if you could eliminate that chemical and substitute something else, that would be the best thing you can do. And typically you can't always do that. But if you could and it is reasonable and falls within other kind of constraints, that would be probably the best thing you could do.

After that comes safeguarding. Safeguarding includes things like physical barrier guards and hardware things but it also can include devices, methods, those kinds of things.

The third, fourth and fifth items which sometimes shift their position include things like training, warning and personal protective equipment and/or clothes, clothing.

So in this case the use of tools would have been one way of helping to safeguard this particular area. Excuse me. The primary way, though, since you cannot typically, on a press brake you cannot always eliminate the hazard, the most common thing to do is to provide safeguarding. And that typically takes the form of light curtains or other kinds of barriers to prevent your hands from being in the point of operation during the cycle.

Q. Would the protection against inadvertent activation of the machine be a safeguarding method in the safety hierarchy?

A. No, the control activation of machines is not intended to be a way of safeguarding the point of operation on equipment like power presses and those kinds of things. What they want, what they being ANSI and OSHA want, is that point of operation having a safeguarding applied to it, which generally, as I said, is light curtains or barrier guards.

As I mentioned before, there are some situations where it is not reasonable to expect that you are going to use a barrier kind of guard and then you go to administrative/supervisory kinds of activities. But the way to safeguard this point of operation is not to change the foot pedal from one pedal to another. It is just not part of that.

Q. Is inadvertent activation of a press brake ever a good thing?

MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: Well, let me put it this way, inadvertent of the press brake at certain times

could be a terrible thing. It can ruin the press brake. It can ruin parts. It can ruin dyes and it can injure people. But there a lot of times when presses are inadvertently activated and none of those things happen. That's the best I can answer that.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Is it ever good?

MR. ROBINSON: Same objection.

THE WITNESS: I don't know. I have never really thought about it in that context. As I sit here, I can't think of something good about it; but most of the time I think it winds up being benign. But there are serious considerations when any kind of equipment starts up at an inappropriate time.

If your car were to start up at an inappropriate time, it could cause problems. If your car were to move at an inappropriate time, it could cause problems. That doesn't mean that the brakes are bad or the accelerator is bad. It is just unexpected things can quite often cause problems.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Have you applied the safety priority --

have you applied a safety prioritization system in evaluating this accident with Ms. Lindquist?

MR. ROBINSON: I will object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: I think I have. I don't know that I have formally went through it in here but I think I mentioned several times that the solution to this hazard, the solution that would have prevented this accident is not with the foot control but with point-of-operation safeguarding which it is my understanding Cory had on -- available for this kind of machine and for other press, mechanical presses and maybe other press brakes at the facility.

So they were aware of it. They had it. They had it in place. They had it -- they are familiar with it. It wasn't like they were strangers of this kind of safeguarding. They just didn't apply it on this machine and allowed it to be operated without point-of-operation safeguarding. That would be Item No. 2 on the safety hierarchy, providing some kind of safeguarding.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Would you agree, sir, that had not

Ms. Lindquist inadvertently activated the foot control on the day of her accident, this injury would not have occurred?

MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form of the question. Misstates the testimony. Misstates this witness's prior testimony where he did not acknowledge the inadvertent activation at all. So you are now trying to get an answer that changes his prior testimony. It is very misleading the way you did that.

THE WITNESS: Yeah, you know, I think previously I said I think she was riding the pedal. But regardless there are a lot of things you could say if it wasn't for this, this accident wouldn't have happened.

Maybe if she had been home that day, it wouldn't have happened. Maybe if someone else had volunteered for the job, it wouldn't have happened. Maybe if there had been a lightning storm and the power went out, it wouldn't have happened.

The reason this accident happened isn't because she may have, and I don't believe she did, but you are alluding to maybe she inadvertently stuck her foot in there. The reason this accident happened

is because her employer ignored all of the training criteria, all of the supervisory criteria, all of the guarding criteria of ANSI, their industry and OSHA.

They set up the machine and allowed it to be operated without a point-of-operation safeguarding. They set it up where she was having her hands in the point of operation. They didn't encourage her or test her or verify for themselves that she read the manual, that she followed any of the instructions in the manual or on the machine and they allowed that condition to go on long enough that eventually I believe while riding the pedal she injured her hands.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Sir, my question is had not Ms. Lindquist have activated the foot control, would you agree that she would not have been injured on the day of her accident?

A. No, no, had her hands not been in there -- I mean there are a lot of things. You know, where do you want to draw the line? It is -- the cause of this accident -- the cause of this accident isn't that she -- that you are alleging that her

foot accidentally went in there.

That's allowed to happen. That's allowed by the codes and standards to happen. You are supposed to have a point-of-operation safeguarding.

The question you should be asking me is isn't it true this accident wouldn't have happened if this employer did the custom and practice, if this employer followed ANSI standards, if this employer followed OSHA standards, if this employer put on this machine what they had on every other machine in the adjacent area, those kinds of safeguarding. That's what would have prevented this accident from happening.

But you are posing a question that, you know, if you want, yes, if it wasn't for that, it wouldn't have happened but that's not the causal factor here.

Q. Sir, my question is -- I am entitled to ask the question as I see fit and you are obligated to answer my question.

MR. ROBINSON: Well, that implies that he hasn't.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, he has not answered my question.

MR. ROBINSON: That's argumentative. What's the question?
BY MR. HARTMAN:
Q. My question sir, is, if Ms. Lindquist had not activated the press brake by use of the foot control on the day of this accident, would she have been injured?
A. I can't answer it any better than I already have.
Q. Would she have been injured?
A. I can't answer that question any better than I already have.
Q. Is it your testimony that you cannot answer me that had she not activated the foot pedal, she would not have been injured?
A. No, what I am testifying, I can't answer it any better than I already have; and if I give you a yes-or-no answer, it would be misleading and deceptive. And I don't intend to do that. So I am giving you the best, complete, clear answer I can.
Q. What is deceptive about if she had not operated the foot control, the machine would not have cycled and her hand would not have been injured? What is deceptive about that statement?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection, argumentative.
BY MR. HARTMAN:
Q. That statement?
MR. ROBINSON: Objection, argumentative.
Why are you yelling, Mr. Hartman?
BY MR. HARTMAN:
Q. Answer me.
A. My answer if I were to give that answer would be deceptive because it leaves out important facts, the fact that it is not safeguarded, the fact that the employer knew it was safeguarded, the fact that the employer avoided and did not follow all of these mandated requirements, that the employer had these safeguards readily available to them and they didn't use those. Those kind of things, leaving those things out leaves someone who doesn't know that with a misleading conclusion. And I am sworn here to tell the truth, the complete truth, at least that's my impression, and answering the question yes or no would not do that.
Q. Sir, would you agree that the machine cycled by the operation of the foot control on the day of Ms. Lindquist's injury?
A. Yes, it did.

Q. Would you agree, sir, that had she not hit the foot control the machine would not have cycled?

A. I will agree with that.

Q. Would you agree that had the machine not cycled there would have not been the opportunity for her hands to be crushed?

MR. ROBINSON: I will object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: Had the machine cycled -- repeat that.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Sir, my question was, had the machine not cycled while her hands were in the dye, she would not have sustained the injury?

A. Sure, if her hands were out of the dye because there a was a point-of-operation safeguarding, for example, or followed procedures, she would not have been injured.

Q. No, I am saying, sir, if your hands are in the dye and the machine doesn't cycle, you will not be injured; will you agree with me on that?

A. Injured as she was, that's correct.

Q. The last full paragraph of page 13.

A. The one that starts out the use?

Q. Yes.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. The use of a front cover over the foot control would result in a configuration that from a safety perspective might help the operator, might do nothing to help the operator or might hurt the operator; is that your testimony for that?
A. Yes.
Q. The plaintiff's expert has identified this type of device as a Class 5 device on the classification of safeguarding device, Ralph Barnett, R. Barnett, P. Barroso, Junior, Triodyne Safety Brief, V.1, N.1, Reprint April 1981.
Did I correctly read that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand what the classification of safety devices is as authored by Professor Barnett and Mr. Barroso?
A. Sure, I think in his development of that over the years I have actually given him examples of things.
Q. Do you agree with the classification systems outlined on -- in the article on the classification of safeguarding devices?

MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Do I agree that he wrote it --
BY MR. HARTMAN:
Q. No, do you agree with classifying safety systems as outlined in that article?
MR. ROBINSON: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: You can classify safety devices in various different ways. That is just one way that has been done by other people and Ralph Barnett incorporated it into a safety brief.
BY MR. HARTMAN:
Q. Have you ever used that classification system in classifying safety devices?
A. I actually use that as one of the examples of ways to classify safety devices in a safety course that I teach.
Q. Is it a legitimate method of classifying safety systems?
MR. ROBINSON: I will object to the form of the question.
THE WITNESS: It is legitimate but it can't be taken in a vacuum. You can't just say we are going to classify things and not think about codes and standards, criteria, accident trends, all of those

other kinds of things.

But if someone puts you in a room and says all I want you to do is come up with two or three different ways of classifying safety devices, this could be one of those ways.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Do you classify the foot control with a gate as a Class 5 safety system?

A. I would say following this protocol, this method, it would be a Class 5 device.

Q. In your analysis of this type of safety system with a gated foot control, would you utilize the classification system?

A. I didn't understand the question. Say that again.

Q. Well, would you use the classification system as outlined in the --

A. Safety briefs?

Q. Safety brief on the classification of safeguarding devices to evaluate the foot control in this situation?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn't -- I probably wouldn't approach it that way. The way I would go

is I would look at the codes and standards and see what they mandate, what they require.

And they allow, they mandate, they require the kind of pedal that we saw that was sold with this product when Heim -- when it left Heim's control and at the time of the accident. So I would look to that. I wouldn't waste time trying to classify it.

The only reason for this section to be here is Ralph Barnett has said this is a good way to make this evaluation, and he has come up with a chart and a classification system that if you follow and if you use, you have to come to the conclusion that the gate on the front of a pedal is a bad idea for Heim to require or mandate on a press brake of this type.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. So basically the reason you have that paragraph is to comment on Professor Barnett's analysis as opposed to saying you are using the system for your own analysis?

A. I am commenting on the fact that prior to this case he published documents and embraced positions having to do with classification and

safeguarding, application of safeguards that are 180 degrees or just the opposite to what he is now saying in this case. That was the reason.

Q. Sir, the reason you said that specific citation is because you are pointing out that with regard to that citation at that point in your report is to illustrate that Professor Barnett has testified or has classified things differently in prior situations?

MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: Not that he has classified things in prior depositions. That in his report and for this case he has taken a position that's counter to his general publications about safety and this is one.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. So you are not incorporating the classification system outlined in the classification of safety devices as part of your analysis as to whether or not the foot control with a gate is appropriate for use with a Heim press brake?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: I wouldn't have used that

classification system, no. It wouldn't be a primary resource. You might -- if someone said make an exhaustive list of all of the reasons why not to do this, this might be one of them; but it wouldn't be the first, second or third.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Is that something that you used in determining that you would not utilize a gated foot control on a press brake?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: No, what I would use are the codes and standards. But if someone said what about beyond codes and standards, what about beyond custom and practice, what about beyond what someone else is selling, what else could you do? How else could we approach this? I might say, well, there is this classification system and let's try to use that.

And if we use that, we find we are consistent with the codes and standards and custom and practice that do not embrace the use of a foot pedal with a door on it for press brakes.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. I understand that if someone asked that

but in formulating your opinion did you use that classification system as part of your analysis as to why a gated foot control should not be utilized in conjunction with the Heim press brake?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: I considered it. I went through it but I didn't use it as my primary analysis, no.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Did you use it as any part of your analysis?

A. Just to point out the inconsistency.

Q. So you basically have just used it to rebut what Professor Barnett has said to show he has been inconsistent in his report --

A. What I did was I said, let's assume that We were to use press -- Ralph Barnett's safety philosophy. Let's assume we were to use it. It would be -- it would result in a conclusion contrary to what he has testified in his deposition and in his report. That's what I primarily used it for.

But as I said, you could use it. I don't know that I overtly used it, and I wouldn't think it is the primary deciding factors by any means.

But it is inconsistent with what his philosophy is in his writings and what he is now saying in this case.

Q. If his classification system would have said that the foot control should be utilized, the gated foot control should be utilized in conjunction with a press brake, would that have changed your opinion?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: Well, it would be an irrational result. It would be inconsistent with the thing. If you have something that says it should be round, round, round and now I say it should be square, you would say this article doesn't make any sense.

So if you use the philosophy, philosophical aspects here, you wouldn't come to that conclusion; and if it did, you would say this article doesn't make sense.

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record at 11:47 a.m.

(A short break was taken.)

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This is the beginning of Tape No. 3. Back on the record at 11:51 a.m.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Let's turn to page 14, please.

A. Sure.
Q. With regard to training and the safety hierarchy, would HOOD be a training method of safeguarding machines?
MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form.
BY MR. HARTMAN:
Q. Do you know what HOOD is?
A. Yes.
Q. What is HOOD?
A. HOOD is an abbreviation or acronym that stands for Hands Out of Dyes.
Q. Is part of the Hands Out of Dyes method of safeguarding the machine, the operator, involve training of the operator?
MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.
THE WITNESS: That's two questions really.
Hands Out of Dyes is a recommended practice that currently is not a complete adequate way of safeguarding most machines in most operations but it is something that's embraced by ANSI. It is something embraced by OSHA. It is something embraced by the safety community.
It relies heavily on supervision, training and worker's ability to perform their function with the

right kinds of, in this case, perhaps right kinds of hand tools to take pieces and put them in and take them out.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. So HOOD requires supervisory training, operator training, designing the interface with the point of operation and use of tools by the operator?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: It requires that the worker, the operator be trained, has supervision and probably in this particular operation be provided with tools so as to put the piece parts in and to take the completed or the part out after it has been processed.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Do you know why HOOD has not been instituted as a means to eliminate hands being in the dye area?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: Because when it was introduced, it was introduced at a time when procedural standards were not accepted very well. And at that point in time in the '70s, most of the standards

were being written around hardware kinds of things.

Today, if HOOD was introduced today, it might be more likely to be embraced and accepted because we have many more procedural standards that are accepted now.

The problem with HOOD was that employers started to use it in place of safeguarding. They started to rely too heavily on it. And when they could have easily provided point-of-operation safeguarding, they would say, well, we will just train the guy or train the person and rely on that when it probably was better to do it other ways.

HOOD also had some application for small production runs where point-of-operation safeguarding may have been impractical. And under those circumstances it was decided that you could run a machine and put your hands in the point of operation as long as there was a lot of supervision, administrative controls and it cost production which meant money.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. On the first full paragraph of page 14 beginning with additionally --

A. Yes.

Q. -- it says additionally there is some enhanced hazard communication to an operator in the use of this, where in the sheer operation of the machine informs the operator of the presence of a potential hazard at the point of operation.

Did I correctly read your report?

A. I think so.

Q. And is that your testimony today?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you explain what you mean by the sheer operation of the machine informing the operator of a hazard communication?

A. If I have a hole in that wall that your finger could fit in and you have no idea what's on the other side, you might put your finger in it not knowing what's on the other side. It is just a hole in the wall.

But if the rest of the wall was Plexiglass and you saw that on the other side of the wall there were bunch of poisonous snakes and if you put your finger in there, the snakes would bite you, you probably wouldn't put your finger there.

This machine manifests its danger every time it makes a piece. There is a huge ram. There

are huge dye pieces. There are stationary pieces that come together with enough force to bend and shape metal. And there is no doubt about it that if you have your hand there, it will be injured.

Ralph Barnett in one of his publications has the Doctrine of Manifest Danger, which talks about that fact. When danger announces itself, that phenomenon itself is part of the safety of the machinery.

When brakes start to fail and they start to make an ugly noise before they put you in jeopardy, that's part of the safety of the machine. When a machine starts to vibrate for three days before it throws a piece out and hurts you, that vibration is alerting you to that something is wrong.

This machine, its very action tells the operator that if they have their hand in there and they touch the controls or the controls were to go off by themselves, that they would be seriously hurt.

Now the plaintiff in this case acknowledged the fact, and I think she used the term, yeah, it is common sense that if my hands are

in there and I put my foot on the pedal, I am going to be hurt.

So I am talking about it. Ralph Barnett had a publication about it. The plaintiff in this case acknowledges she knew that was the situation.

Q. The Doctrine of Manifest Danger is the protocol advocated by designers for causing a machine or a system to communicate to users that its safety has been compromised before the injury occurs; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Doctrine of Manifest Danger, is that something you understand?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that something you agree with?

MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: You know this, the Doctrine of Manifest Danger is a title that Ralph Barnett has put on this. This concept has been around for a long time, and we have all known it.

We know that you shouldn't step out in front of a moving car; and the bigger the car is, whether it is a truck, it is even more likely you don't want to step out in front of. If it is a little kid on

a tricycle, you might step out in front of it because you know it is not a big danger.

So these concepts in some ways are ubiquitous in our upbringing in the United States. So it is not like I agree that someone has come up with putting this title on here.

This concept is something I don't think is something that you say you agree with. I think it is something we have all experienced. And in a safety brief this was just made into an article to highlight that.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. What do you call the protocol advocated by designers for causing a machine or system to communicate to users its safety has been compromised before an injury occurs?

A. What do I call it?

Q. Yes.

A. I call it that people have some common sense and can identify many of the hazards in their environment, work environment, home environment and they respond appropriately.

Now, there are some hazards it is hard to understand. So a hot pot, a little kid doesn't

know it is hot and they are apt to take their hands on it and get burned. So that's an example of a hazard that doesn't manifest its danger.

Now and perhaps you could make pots that when they got hot, changed color and then you can see it is hot because it changes color and we haven't done that.

But there is this protocol that we go through in our every day lives as users and protocols that people use in designing equipment that help to tell us that there is a hazard there. It may be the way a machine moves, it vibrates, makes a noise, a light comes on. All of those things tell us there is a hazard here and that's what this manifest danger fancy titled article was about.

And it was put kind to make it a little more interesting in the context of when things fail. But manifest danger isn't just about when things fail. If the danger is there, sometimes it manifests itself in a very obvious way; and sometimes it is hidden.

In this case that danger would have been very obvious to anyone who uses this machine.

Q. Is there a protocol advocated by designers for causing a machine or system to communicate to users its safety has been compromised before an injury occurs?

A. I think there is this general protocol that you try to alert people in your design and in your use of equipment, you appreciate that, that something is hazardous, yes.

Q. What is the compatibility hypothesis that you utilized in the fourth full paragraph, third line, it says, in the deposition of one of the Cory setup personnel, it is indicated that all other presses at the plant utilized light curtains and/or two hand controls but plaintiff's expert has ignored his own compatibility hypothesis.

A. Yes. If you look at Ralph Barnett's publications, one of them has a section about the compatibility hypothesis. And the idea is if you have five similar machines that they should have or one machine with five similar hazards on it, for example, that all of those hazards should have about the same level of safety.

So if there are five pinch points on a machine and one has a guard on it that's

interlocked, then they probably all should have guards that are interlocked because people have the expectation that it is going to be guarded equally. So there is this compatibility kind of thing.

It is incompatible if one is guarded to a higher level than another. So if you have multiple machines and they all have light curtains on them, in some ways it is very incompatible to have a very similar machine, has similar kinds of things, has similar kinds of hazards and you don't put it on there.

The reasonable thing to do is to try to make those machines all consistent and compatible one with the other which would mean in this case having light curtains on this machine.

So in his writings Ralph Barnett has embraced this idea that workplaces should have consistency or compatibility in safeguarding approaches. In this particular case he hasn't mentioned that. He has ignored that, the fact that other machines with similar hazards have light curtains on it and this one doesn't. That is incompatible. That can lead to an accident by itself.

Q. Do you agree with the compatibility hypothesis?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: I believe in the compatibility hypothesis not using necessarily that term. It is something that we all have again experienced. If you have a fleet of cars in your house, two or three cars, as you get from one car to another, the horn is in the center. The horn is on here. The horn is on the end of the thing.

It is the inconsistency. So you are in an emergency and you are used to driving the car with the horn on the center. And you hit the center. It doesn't do anything. It is not compatible with the other car.

So there is this inconsistency that can cause accidents by itself. If sounding your horn was critical and you couldn't find your horn and you had to search around three different places to find it, it may delay you sounding your horn to the point where there is an accident.

So I believe in the fact that compatibility and miscompatibility can lead to reducing accidents and increasing the probability of accidents.

Q. Did the incompatibility of safeguards in the Cory plant cause the accident Ms. Lindquist was involved in?

MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: I don't think the incompatibility by itself did. I think it needed a point-of-operation guarding, and I think the point-of-operation safeguarding should have been compatible with the other machines.

So if the other machines all used light curtains, I think it is reasonable to use light curtains here. If all of the other machines used barrier guards and this one used a light curtain, then there might be some incompatibility where people have the expectation that this machine has a barrier guard on it when it doesn't.

But I don't think the incompatibility here caused it. The point I was trying to make in this part of the report was that if you looked at compatibility and incompatibility, the obvious conclusion would be this machine needs to be compatible with the other machines. It should have had the same safeguarding. It should have had light curtains.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. On page 15 you indicate that there are additional comments concerning the plaintiff's expert report.

A. Yes.

Q. Does -- did anything in Professor Barnett's report -- strike that.

Did you use anything in Professor Barnett's report in order to formulate your opinion that the Heim press brake was safe?

MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: Did I use anything in his report to conclude that the Heim press is safe?

I used the same codes and standards he used. I used the same ANSI and OSHA codes, and they say the press is safe. The press as far as the foot control the way Heim sold it is safe.

BY MR. HARTMAN:

Q. Let me rephrase the question.

Did you rely upon any of Professor Barnett's writings or articles or analysis to make your determination that's contained in your report that the Heim press brake was safe?

MR. ROBINSON: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: Well, you kind of asked this question as we have gone along about do I believe in this doctrine, do I believe in this safety philosophy, do I believe in this theorem that Ralph Barnett has before and typically my answer has been in regards to this accident and this piece of equipment and the foot controls, I wouldn't use those. I would use the codes and standards as primary sources for making that decision.

And then I said if I was asked to, I might use other methods and they might include the general literature and the custom and practice. And one of those other methods might be using some of these philosophical approaches.

As I mentioned, I use several of these philosophical approaches in classes I teach about safety. But you can't take these things in a microcosm and then apply them cart blanche. There are broad statements in these publications repeatedly that I think are inconsistent, and I used those to identify those inconsistencies. And I don't see a problem in using those.

I don't see a problem in saying the dependency